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Dispute Resolution
Alternatives to conventional courtroom dispute resolution have re-
cently received enthusiastic support from a surprising array of pro-
ponents, ranging from Chief Justice Warren Burger' to consumer
advocate Ralph Nader.2 The Ford Foundation3 and the Department of
Justice4 are promoting various alternate avenues for resolving con-
flicts. The American Bar Association,5 scholarly journals," and the
1. See Address by Chief Justice Burger at the ABA Conference on the Resolution of
Minor Disputes (May 27, 1977), quoted in Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1978, at 48, cols. 5-6 ("The
notion that ordinary people want black-robed judges, well-dressed lawyers and fine-
paneled courtrooms as the setting to resolve their disputes isn't correct. People with
problems, like people with pains, want relief and they want it as quickly and inexpen-
sively as possible.")
2. See Nader, Consumerism and Legal Services: The Merging of Movements, 11 LAw
& Soc'y Rtv. 247, 255 (1976) ("The [legal] system must be designed to encourage the non-
legal resolution of disputes, and public participation in planning processes, as well as
more traditional legal activity like litigation.")
3. See FORD FOUNDATION, MEDIATING SOCIAL CONFLICT 4 (1978) (third-party intervention
efforts supported by Ford Foundation include mediation, arbitration, facilitation, fact-
finding, and conciliation); Ford Foundation, Current Interests of the Ford Foundation:
1978 and 1979, at 6-7 ("The [Ford] Foundation plans to support investigations of new ways
of settling disputes that may be more equitable, cheaper, and less divisive than the
adversary process.")
4. Neighborhood Justice Centers have been sponsored by the Law Enforcement As-
sistance Administration of the Department of Justice. See Neighborhood Justice Centers
to be tried, LAwscoPE, Jan. 1978, at 29 (announcing program, Attorney General Griffin
Bell said he hoped centers would provide "'an avenue to justice for many persons now
shut out of the legal system' ").
5. See ABA Report on the National Conference on Minor Disputes Resolution 11-12
(May 1977) (prepared by F. Sander) (discussing origin of Neighborhood Justice Center
idea) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report].
6. See Cahn & Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 927 (1966); Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized
System of Criminal Justice, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1, 41-48 (1973); Danzig & Lowy, Everyday
Disputes and Mediation in the United States: A Reply to Professor Felstiner, 9 LAw &
Soc'Y REv. 675 (1975); Galanter, Delivering Legality: Some Proposals for the Direction of
Research, 11 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 225 (1976); L. Susskind, J. Richardson & K. Hildebrand,
Resolving Environmental Disputes (M.I.T. Environmental Impact Assessment Project
June 1978).
Scholars are also beginning to criticize the movement. See, e.g., Abel, Delegalization: A
Critical Review of Its Ideology, Manifestation, and Social Consequences (on file with
Yale Law Journal).
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popular press 7 have endorsed such efforts; Congress has considered
authorizing more experiments along these lines.8 In this issue, the Yale
Law Journal joins in devoting attention to this trend. Yet the pieces
presented here take a critical perspective by considering, in varied ways,
the goals underlying these alternatives, the practical and theoretical
barriers that may prevent achievement of their goals, and the costs or
risks that may warrant reconsideration of the entire endeavor.
"Alternative dispute resolution" is a label ascribed to an increasingly
broad range of options that share few characteristics aside from their
common departure from traditional courtroom procedures. Thus, the
alternatives include newly created forums, such as Neighborhood
Justice Centers9 and complaint departments in the offices of state at-
torneys general.' 0 Others, such as the innovative use of masters in
federal district courts," expand the traditional judicial role. Some
entrust the powers and functions of a judge to a different actor, such
as a magistrate . 2 Other experiments, more detached from the official
legal system, arrange incentives for parties to settle their differences
out of court,' 3 train neighborhood residents to mediate local disputes, 14
and urge prison and school administrators to adopt grievance pro-
cedures within their institutions.15
On a general level, advocates for the different alternatives declare
that they are pursuing similar purposes. Chiefly, the innovations are in-
tended to alleviate the persistent inaccessibility of judicial relief for
poor and middle-class people by providing cheaper and less formal
methods for resolving disputes. These purposes echo the goals of law-
reform efforts that produced the small claims court and legal services
for the poor earlier in the century. Then, as now, observers of the
judicial system identified crowded dockets, burdensome delays, and
mounting expenses as factors eroding public confidence in the ability
of the courts to function as the primary means of dispute resolution.'
7. See, e.g., Cattani, From courthouses of many doors .. . to third-party intervention,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 17, 1979, at 12, col. I.
8. See Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, p. 1062 n.104 infra.
9. See notes 4 & 5 supra.
10. See Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, p. 998 infra.
11. See Note, supra note 8, at 1068-72.
12. See Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal
Magistrates: A Dissenting View, p. 1023 infra.
13. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, p. 950 infra.
14. See Danzig, supra note 6, at 41-48 (community moots).
15. Note, supra note 8, at 1086-88 (prisons); W. Lincoln, Mediation: A Transferable
Process for the Prevention and Resolution of Racial Conflict in Public Secondary Schools
(A.A.A. Case Study June 30, 1976) (schools).
16. Compare Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, 27 INT'L J. ETHICS 150, 151
(1917) (attributing dissatisfaction with judiciary to decline of other social institutions and
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Similarly, the early reformers, like more recent critics of the judicial
system, argued that easing access to court would not remedy all the
weaknesses of judicial conflict resolution. They blamed the formality,
technicality, and adversarial nature of courtroom proceedings for pro-
ducing results ultimately unsatisfactory to many parties.17
What prompts the current resurgence of interest in innovative
methods for resolving disputes? One cause may well be the pressure of
ever-increasing judicial caseloads, yet the current movement may also
indicate a new phase in a larger cycle of reform efforts. Reform, con-
solidation, entrenchment, and revived reform are stages in a familiar
pattern in the history of social institutions.'8 Reformers alternate be-
tween building institutions and taking them apart,' 9 between urging
regulation and calling for deregulation. 20 The current push for less
formal methods for resolving disputes may reflect waning faith in
established institutions and professions. The distinctly populist cast of
the movement for alternative dispute resolution rests on an implicit
belief in neighborhoods, private bargaining, and decisionmakers less
heavy reliance on legal system to impose order) with ABA Report, supra note 5, at 2
(noting decline of family and church and greater reliance on courts as one cause of over-
burdened caseloads; "[a]long with the frustration engendered by the unresponsiveness of
the legal system there has come a perceptible disenchantment with the increasing com-
plexity and remoteness of the traditional dispute resolution process").
17. Compare Pound, Book Review, 33 HARV. L. REv. 621, 624-25 (1920) (procedural and
administrative reform advocated to reduce "expense and irritation" of court proceedings;
new small claims courts, conciliation courts, and domestic relations courts lauded for
changing "purely contentious conception of a judicial proceeding") with ABA Report,
supra note 5, at 2 ("Sometimes the legal process appears to be so cumbersome that it
develops a life of its own and loses sight of the underlying problems it was designed to
resolve. Disputants appear to yearn increasingly for a simple, and accessible procedure
that permits them to tell their story and get prompt and constructive assistance .... ")
Golding distinguishes between the "original conflict," meaning the dispute which precedes
the dispute-resolution process, and the "persuasive conflict," meaning the presentation of
evidence and arguments in support of one's side of the case once the procedure has
started. When the persuasive conflict supersedes the original dispute, as in adjudication,
the resolution typically depends more on technical procedures than on the particularities
of the parties, and the result is generally a remedy or award rather than a reconciliation.
Golding, Preliminaries to the Study of Procedural Justice, in LAIw, REASON, AND JUSTICE
86-90 (G. Hughes ed. 1969). To the extent that a procedure shapes and solves a "persua-
sive conflict" that differs from the "original conflict," party dissatisfaction can be
expected.
18. One example is the fluctuation between centralization and decentralization in
school administration. See D. RAviTc, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS (1975).
19. Deinstitutionalization is the current watchword among prison and mental-health
reformers. E.g., COMMUNITY-BASED CORRECTIONS: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND RESEARCH (P.
Boesen & S. Grupp eds. 1976) (prisons); Civil Commitment, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
(ABA) 77, 114-17 (1978) (least-drastic-alternative standard in mental-health treatment).
This position brings ideas, at least in the field of mental health, full circle to a position
espoused by reformers 150 years ago. S. SEGAL & U. AViRAM, THE MENTALLY ILL IN CoM-
MUNITY-BASED SHELTERED CARE 1-13 (1978).
20. See ABA CoIMa'N ON LAW & THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO RE-
FORM (Exposure Draft Aug. 19, 1978).
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detached than judges and lawyers; but it may also stem from growing
distrust of accumulated centers of power, especially governmental
power. The emphasis placed upon negotiation, bargaining, and com-
promise elevates party control of the process by the disputants and
reduces the importance of pre-established authority and rules.
To fulfill their promise, the alternatives have to increase the satisfac-
tion of parties while resolving disputes no less effectively than tradi-
tional techniques. Practical limitations may interfere with this task:
the resources necessary to train third parties and to establish inde-
pendent forums may be either unavailable or available only from
sources that limit the efficacy or availability of relief.21 Techniques
that effectively resolve disputes in one context may not be easily
transferred to another, 2 2 and parties may grow disappointed during the
time it takes to develop new methods. Some alternatives may never be
effective unless backed up by judicial enforcement that, in turn, entails
hidden costs in time, money, and coordination.
Further, alternative dispute-resolution techniques may achieve the
goal of satisfying the parties by reducing their expectations about
the kinds of relief to which they are entitled. This risk becomes a
serious danger if an individual loses a federal constitutional right by
participating in a nonjudicial alternative. For example, rights to
counsel, to trial by jury, and to be free from compulsory self-incrimina-
tion, may be unavailable to a criminal defendant participating in a
restitution program. 23 In addition to the intrinsic deprivation, this loss
might expose the individual to greater risk than would a judicial
hearing.
In a sense, the danger of temporary or permanent interference with
individual rights derives from an essential difference between many of
the alternatives and conventional judicial dispute resolution. The
judiciary, and to some extent the alternatives that simply add flexibility
to its operations, adhere to the rule of law; they base their decisions on
legally validated procedural and substantive norms.24 The less formal
alternatives rely instead on implicit community values, compromise,
21. See Nader, supra note 10, at 1009-10 (businesses exert control over consumer com-
plaint mechanisms).
22. See Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, p. 916 infra (labor arbitra-
tion teaches us little about usefulness of arbitration in other contexts).
23. See Stanley, The Resolution of Minor Disputes and the Seventh Amendment, 60
MARQ. L. REv. 963 (1977) (discussing risk posed to right of trial by jury by informal
dispute tribunals). It might be possible, however, to maintain traditional trials and in-
troduce informal restitution techniques only at the sentencing stage.
24. A classic discussion of the rule of law is L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev.
ed. 1969). Fuller argues that the notion of "law" itself entails the consistent application
of clear norms announced in advance of a particular case. Id. at 39.
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and individualized discretion. These approaches may be uniquely suited
to the satisfactory resolution of many of the conflicts that reformers
would send to alternative forums. Disagreements between neighbors,
disputes within a family, and conflicts among individuals with ongoing
institutional relationships may best be resolved if the adversarial com-
bat of a judicial confrontation is avoided and the parties reserve
control over the terms of the settlement. But compromise may be ill-
suited to the vindication of legally protected rights, and compromise
may be impossible when a dispute involves several strongly held, but
inconsistent, community values. Some controversial problems handled
by courts involve just such issues. Although extraordinary decisions in
difficult times may cause some to question a court's legitimacy, the
judicial process of applying and declaring law is more likely to survive
such challenges than are fledgling alternatives.
What is needed is a set of "jurisdictional" principles that delimit
those areas in which informal dispute-resolution techniques are both
workable and permissible. These principles should identify the par-
ticular kinds of disputes that lend themselves, in a practical sense, to
resolution through negotiation or through relatively unstructured ad-
versarial presentations to arbiters. They should also specify when we
should be willing to forsake our traditional respect for the rule of law
by allowing parties or arbiters to resolve a particular case without ref-
erence to preexisting rules. A key consideration, of course, is the ex-
tent to which we may rely on the possibility of taking a dispute to
court to add structure, consistency and authority to its resolution in an
informal forum. The present process of experimentation would benefit
from a greater sensitivity to these thorny issues.
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